The vague rules are explored by way of figurative or allegorical reasoning. 2 skating competition. They score performances, they indicate which they like and why.
But they do not pretend to any determinate formula or precise grammar for figure-skating aesthetics. Their scores are rarely in exact agreement.
By marking their judgment in particular instances, enabling us to surmise their sensibilities, 3 Smith enables us to react to the judges, to discover whether, to use Smith's pervasive expressions, we happily -enter into‖ their interpretations and attitudes, whether our sentiments -beat time‖ with theirs. We judge the judges. We do so by appealing to higher judges; we proceed, as it were, to the even sketchier panel who assess the panel who assess figure-skating. Smith sketches the spectator not as an inscrutable authority that issues a code of righteousness, but as a being much like ourselves to whom we morally respond and by whom we may be edified.
Smith says:
All such sentiments suppose the idea of some other being, who is the natural judge of the person that feels them; and it is only by sympathy with the decisions of this arbiter of his conduct, that [the individual] can conceive, either the triumph of self-applause, or the shame of self-condemnation. (TMS, 193) 4 Throughout Smith's work, figurative beings, though only sketchy, even subconscious, mediate social affairs and moral conduct. We relate to each other, and to ourselves, by way of substantive yet figurative beings, and how they would feel about the matters in view. In Smith's 1761 essay on the first formation of languages, he comes to the following sentences:
The word I, does not, like the word man, denote a particular class of objects, separated from all others by peculiar qualities of their own. It is far from being the name of a species, but, on the contrary, whenever it is made use of, it always denotes a precise individual, the particular person who then speaks. It may be said to be, at once, both what the logicians call, a singular, and what they call, a common term; and to join in its signification the seemingly opposite qualities of the most precise individuality, and the most extensive generalization (Smith 1761, 219 ).
The precise individuality is clear enough, but the word I also always carries -the most extensive generalization,‖ for we always conjure general, albeit tacit, perhaps unconscious, even instinctual, sensations of a being, sensations that mediate our understanding of the person who writes I. We glean the general being that that person is like. For Smith, sympathy could be morally compelling even though -illusive‖ or -imaginary‖ (e.g., TMS, 71, 78, 19, 21, 317) . It is the nexus of such inchoate imaginings that enable us to relate to one another.
I believe that economists practice the Smithian way but are reticent, even unconscious, about doing so. One cause of the reticence is that the figure does not conform to images of science as precise and accurate, or -positive‖ and -objective.‖ The Smithian awareness declares that economic judgment involves aesthetics, but popular images of science say that aesthetics are not supposed to play a role in scientific judgment.
Economists often hold up the idea of economic efficiency as precise, accurate, positive, and objective. I would argue that such claims are overdone. -As Frank H.
Knight has so often emphasized, problems of welfare economics must ultimately dissolve into a study of aesthetics and morals‖ (Coase 1960, 43) . A number of points argue that efficiency is much vaguer than often thought.
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Here I unfold the allegory in certain topics in economics. One topic is the market process as -a system of telecommunications‖ (Hayek 1948, 87) . In the literal sense, prices, profits, inventories, and so on communicate very little. In a figurative sense, however, prices may communicate how to advance the vast concatenation. When skeptics declare: -What communication are you talking about?‖ Hayekians look stupid when not prepared to describe the allegory.
5 Some points one might make about why willingness-to-pay concepts are often ambiguous would include:
(1) The diminishing marginal utility of wealth; (2) The hypothetical nature of propositions, giving rise to ambiguities in, for example, the time-to-adjustment in deciding one's willingness to pay; (3) The collective action problems that might matter to the individual's contemplation of how much he would be willing to pay; (4) The issue of deeper, truer preferences, as opposed to unenlightened preferences, which is especially relevant in considering policy reforms; (5) Identity factors involved in changing policy; (6) In as much as a policy reform would alter future preferences, perhaps of the new and future generations, we have to consider what preferences are worth fostering; (7) The Smithian distinction (TMS, 83, 137, between passive experience of the effects of a change and moral agency for the change; (8) Economists often, perhaps usually, do not have good data on the willingnesses to pay that are most pertinent to their theoretical arguments. And, where -economic efficiency‖ is confined in such a way as to make it relatively precise and accurate, it really is a lower-level criterion for overall judgment. That is, narrower, more precise notions of economic efficiency are not a final arbiter of the social good.
The following sentences appear at the very end of I.M.D. Little's book (1957) A Critique of Welfare Economics: -Economic welfare is a subject in which rigour and refinement are probably worse than useless. … It is satisfying, and impressive, that a rigourous logical system, with some apparent reality, should have been set up in the field of the social sciences: but we must not let ourselves be so impressed that we forget that its reality is obviously limited; and that the degree of such reality is a matter of judgement and opinion‖ (279).
Another is the idea of market, social, or policy error. It is common for scholars to say that society or policymakers have erred. When we get out the microscope, however, we might find that no one erred. How do we have social error without any agent error?
Lying behind the social error is allegorical error. Similarly, we often speak of correction, as in the claim that governments do not correct themselves as well as markets. Again, we can make sense of it by unfolding the underlying allegory.
There are economic tropes, not treated here, such as -social cost/benefit‖ 6 and even -the economy,‖ that may be clarified by bring out the allegory behind the text. In a number of ways, important economic discourse is made clearer, more correct, and more accountable by seeing the allegory behind the text.
The Allegory behind Concatenate Coordination
Elsewhere I have written about coordination (first at Klein 1997), so I keep this section brief.
We should distinguish two kinds of coordination. One is the mutual coordination of Thomas Schelling (1960) Human society, when we contemplate it in a certain abstract and philosophical light, appears like a great, an immense machine, whose regular and harmonious movements produce a thousand agreeable effects. As in any other beautiful and noble machine that was the production of human art, whatever tended to render its movements more smooth and easy, would derive a beauty from this effect, and, on the contrary, whatever tended to obstruct them would displease upon that account: so virtue, which is, as it were, the fine polish to the wheels of society, necessarily pleases; while vice, like the vile rust, which makes them jar and grate upon one another, is as necessarily offensive (TMS, 316; see also 185, 165).
Unfolding the allegory behind concatenate coordination helps us to clarify and assess whether entrepreneurship is coordinative; it helps us to clarify and assess whether free enterprise is a system of cooperation. Unfolding the allegory might spare one from overstating or misrepresenting the case for economic liberty. Meanwhile, it may embolden us-by and large, entrepreneurship is coordinative, economic freedom does conduce to coordination, free enterprise is a system of cooperation-for we can justify those claims in terms of cogent allegories natural to human understanding. But we had better be prepared to elaborate the pertinent allegory, for otherwise we are prone to fall into error of one kind of another.
The Market System as a Communication System
One way to explore the free-market system is to liken it to a system of -The whole acts as one market … so that through many intermediaries the relevant information is communicated to all.‖ Further: -We must look at the price system as such a mechanism for communicating information if we want to understand its real function.‖ And: -It is more than a metaphor to describe the price system as a kind of machinery for registering change, or a system of telecommunications‖ (Hayek 1948, 85-87, italics mine). In his Nobel lecture, Hayek (1974) spoke of -a communication system which we call the market‖ (7; see also Hayek 1955, 99 Unfortunately, this oldest and most general result of the theory of social phenomena [viz., the spontaneous coordination of individual efforts] has never been given a title which would secure it an adequate and permanent place in our thinking. The limitations of language make it almost impossible to state it without using misleading metaphorical words. The only intelligible form of explanation for what I am trying to state would be to say-as we say in Germanthat there is sense [Sinn] in the phenomena; that they perform a necessary function (Hayek 1933, 27 ).
We must work in a zone between embrace and denial of such allegories:
But as soon as we take such phrases in a literal sense, they become untrue. It is an animistic, anthropomorphic interpretation of phenomena, the main characteristic of which is that they are not willed by any mind. And as soon as we recognize this, we tend to fall into an opposite error, which is, however, very similar in kind: we deny the existence of what these terms are intended to describe (Hayek 1933, 27) .
During the remainder of Hayek's career, Hayek wrote only fleeting of a -social mind‖ in his own theorizing. 8 It may be that, launching as he did so fully into attacking collectivist thought, he underplayed the allegory behind in his own text. James Buchanan is another thinker who notably struggles in the zone between embracing and rejecting the allegory-mostly rejecting but not always convincingly (see e.g., Buchanan 1999, 193-96) . The figurative being exercises judgment, and we demand that its character or sensibilities be fleshed out. We want to know what kind of being we are being asked to go along with. We might argue over the character of Joy. We distinguish multiple Joys, perhaps as Joy 1 , Joy 2 , Joy 3 , etc., and highlight and contend over the differences. Some are similar and form a family that we recognize and label. Sometimes we downplay the family bickering and work with the more generic family representative, highlighting differences between separate families-though also aware that all the Joys are of the broadest human family. The judging never ends, so we have to get used to idea that any characterization of Joy invites a further.
Once we get comfortable, once the circle of -we‖ is mutually coordinated, the allegory opens up a fruitful way to think about institutional quality. Unfolding the Allegory Makes It Innocuous A.L. Macfie (1967) noted that -the theory and politics of the eighteenth century did not permit of any explicit theory of society as in some sense a living human organism‖ (69), and Hayek (1955) was probably right to criticize social-organism thinking as misleading or worse. But unfolding the allegory is no slippery slope to grief.
Cannan makes the being an Inca, to make sure that his readers do not start looking around for a benevolent, omniscient, omnipotent being. Making the allegory explicit makes it clear that it is a fiction. There is no being telling Bridget to replace her ovens. And to the extent that moral norms exist within living society, they do not make a social organism. If
Joy were a god, she would not have any powers save perhaps that of conveying her approbation or disapprobation, sensed within one's own breast. The more the allegory is spelled out-in particular, as knowing-the less it seems to correspond to any external being or institution, perhaps least of all government. Again, Smith was right that we work by sympathies with figurative beings, and rejecting such awareness is not sensible. But by embracing the insight, and by explicitly developing a figure with certain sensibilities, and explaining how different institutional arrangements appeal to those sensibilities, we may advance a spirit or ethos that contends for recognition and understanding.
Agent Error
At the agent level, error entails a sense of regret. Israel Kirzner tells of a person walking along the street, seeing a sign offering apples for one dollar, yet proceeding to buy elsewhere for two dollars. Kirzner (1979) writes: -[S]urely, in an important sense he will, when he realizes his mistake, reproach himself for having been so absentminded as to pass by the bargain, which he saw, for the more expensive purchase. In this sense he did commit an error, the error of not acting on the information available to him or not perceiving fully the opportunity before his very nose‖ (129-30). Kirzner repeatedly associates error with regret and self-reproach.
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Actual regret is where you acted on one interpretation of the situation (-apples will cost me two dollars‖), and later you reproach yourself for not having had the insight and judgment instead to see and act on another superior interpretation (-apples will cost me one dollar‖). But also the sense of regret or self-reproach can be only vicarious or potential. You might speak of an individual, such as your brother-in-law or any of a class of people caught in a familiar syndrome, acting in error because under a not fantastic counterfactual-a counterfactual made more relevant and possible by your discussing the error-he could see, or could have seen, the better interpretation.
In discussing affection as habitual sympathy, Smith (TMS) brings up the syndrome of family members who have grown up in absence: -The absent son, the absent 9 This regret/self-reproached-based definition agrees neatly with some of Israel Kirzner's expositions of error. However, in my view, Kirzner is inconsistent, at times holding a broader conception that would not necessarily entail any kind of regret or self-reproach. At page 22 of Kirzner 1992, Kirzner rightly notes that the obviousness of the missed opportunity, and hence the basis for regret or self-reproach -must be a matter of degree.‖ The issue, then, becomes how one draws the lines to delineate error. At times Kirzner, as in the quoted passage, seems to draw the lines, as I do (Klein 1999, 64-69) , such that error is the missing of obvious opportunities and entails a sense of regret, but at other times (e.g., Kirzner 1992, 21-23) he draws the lines much wider, at not-totally-unobvious, and drops the necessity of any regret or self-reproach. For further discussion of the difference, see Klein & Briggeman (2009 economists have found it useful to distinguish them. 12 Also, it should be noted that it is impossible to eradicate a theoretical domain for error, for any agent that says I must emerge from and be subordinate to higher (or deeper) levels. The uppermost articulated level carries hints, understandings, questions, and aspirations relating to a lowermost nonarticulated level, and it is fatal to deny the tacit contacts to higher matters. 13 As a practical matter, there is always a realm above the articulated I. 10 Klein and Briggeman (2009) elaborate the distinction. 11 One reason that error and mistake are often used interchangeably is that mistakes alert us to possible error-if a student's paper is filled with mistakes, maybe he needs to rethink his idea of having done his homework. Another is that action is situated, such that what is to one agent an error may be to a higher agent a mistake, just as the 5 th floor of a building is up to some and down to others. Yet another reason may be that there is no verb for mistake, and hence we resort to using the verb to err even for mistakes. 12 Our distinction between mistake and error comports with Kirzner (1979, 121-22) . 13 See Polanyi 1962; Hayek 1952, 185, 189, 194; 1955, 89; 1967, 62; Klein 1999, 69-71. Correction for each differs. Correcting a mistake is simply revising the instant. A typing mistake is corrected by retyping the word. Correcting an error, however, involves more significant reform of the actor and his notion of how he manages his sub-routines.
In his economics, Adam Smith gave too scant attention to these matters.
14 In the morals, however, he linked error and remorse. For example, he tells of characters in Voltaire who, faced with conflicting interpretations of their moral duty, commit a crime and then -discover their error, and the fraud which had deceived them, and are distracted with horror, remorse, and resentment‖ (177). 15 Smith's thought is suffused with appreciation of knowledge's richness.
Error and Correction as Applied to an Allegorical Being
When it comes to the pervasive talk of -market error,‖ -social error,‖ or -policy error,‖ we find statements that can be clarified and perhaps salvaged only by recourse to a figurative being. In the case of market error, Israel Kirzner writes:
Except in the never-attained state of complete equilibrium, each market is characterized by opportunities for pure entrepreneurial profit. These opportunities are created by earlier entrepreneurial errors which have resulted in shortages, surplus, misallocated resources. (Kirzner 2000, 16; italics mine) Consider an example raised by Kirzner (250f) , the invention of the automobile. Kirzner (1985) writes that -To act entrepreneurially is to identify situations overlooked until now because of error‖ (52).
Speaking historically, surely some of those in the horse-drawn carriage industry had erred. But the invention of the automobile was a highly exceptional event. It is possible that only some, it is conceivable, in fact, that none, in the horse-drawn carriage industry actually looked back on their undertakings with a feeling that they had acted foolishly, that they should have been more aware than they were. They may not have erred. Similarly, it is conceivable that no individual undertook any correction of a foregoing error.
I think that the general interpretation of the market correction of error is greatly enhanced by interpreting the process by analogy to how a figurative being who gives instructions might have felt about it. As we look back on the economic history, we know things that our predecessors did not, and we attribute such knowledge to our figurative
being. If Joy knew what was coming-and surely some inventors had early anticipations
of what was in fact coming-and she nonetheless communicated instructions to build and expand livery stables and stage-coach lines-undertakings that subsequently did not pay off socially-Joy would be erring. Her giving of such instructions is something she would look back on with regret. She would feel she erred. As those bad instructions were reversed and she reconsidered whatever had impelled such a faulty plan, she would be correcting her error. Like the metaphor of market communication, the talk of market error and correction is really best understood by way of allegory.
If we deny the allegory, if we confine our thinking and talk to agent error and correction, we may fall into statements that are not justifiable in those terms. But the point here is not to avoid talk of market communication, error, and correction. But Joy's point of view stands in contrast to that of the FDA official as the structures actually exist and function. Economists, including Stigler (1966, 74-75) and Coase (1975, 59) , have been quick to explain that the individual FDA reviewer does not 19 If we, instead, allowed Joy's instructions to be specific to each individual drug decision, so that Joy might use her super knowledge of the particular case, we would weaken the affinity between the agent's context and Joy's framework for issuing instructions. 20 Conceivably these -cut points‖ would otherwise become so permissive as to run into further issues of the FDA abiding by the legislation that it is charged with executing, but it is clear that there is ample scope for relaxation without running into such issues.
necessarily err when he is stingy with permission, because the consequences of permitting a bad drug loom much larger for him personally than do the consequences of not permitting a good drug. Although it is possible that the human agents involved in the process do err, the more central point is that they need not: the high rate of Type-2 bad outcomes (as well as the associate suppression of drug development) does not necessarily reflect any agent error. They do not necessarily entail any regret or self-reproach, even of only the vicarious or potential sorts. Perhaps the error told of in the familiar analysis is only figurative.
The figurative dimension does not hinge on assuming no agent error. Even if we assume that some of the agents did err, it can still be very useful to think figuratively. The vicarious or potential regret can be said to fall back on some notion of a generalized being the actor could have sympathized with, could have seen himself as like. Indeed, Smith's internal arbiters-he speaks of the conscience, the inhabitant, inmate, or man within the breast, the impartial spectator, the supposed impartial spectator, the representative of the impartial spectator-are all usefully interpreted as allegorical or metaphorical figures. Smith even let's on: -The real or even imaginary presence of the impartial spectator, the authority of the man within the breast, is always at hand …‖ (TMS, 292, italics mine).
I suspect that the conclusion that there is social error without any agent error rubs us, as human beings, the wrong way. I suspect that we are programmed 21 to think that if there is social error, somewhere along the line there must be agent errors. I suspect that we are programmed to think that Smith's fourth source of moral approval, particularly the 21 Programmed, that is culturally or genetically, though, as Hayek argues, culture plays such a large role in both genetic selection and genetic exfoliation that the distinction is dubious.
aesthetic beauty in the social system writ large advancing happiness, tends to go with the other three sources, which have to do with the propriety of the micro behaviors in terms of the actor's intentions, the moral responses of those effected, and how those micro interactions fit customs or established rules of conduct. Indeed, there are cultural dynamics which may give rise to such consonance between the four sources of moral approval: When some analyst, at 100,000 feet up, notices failings at the grand fourth source she tends to voice them and challenge the sense of propriety that has till now But by acting according to the dictates of our moral faculties, we necessarily pursue the most effectual means for promoting the happiness of mankind, and may therefore be said, in some sense, to co-operate with the Deity, and to advance as far as in our power the plan of Providence (Smith, TMS, 166; italics added) .
But in a world checkered with baneful policies that enjoy official propriety and the assent or even approval of the cultural elites, and are awfully imperviousness to challenge, the presumption of consonance seems much less assured. We should allow that Joy error does not necessarily entail any actual agent error. If humans tend to overestimate the traversability of the impasse between Joy error and agent error, that could help explain why they are disinclined to bring out the allegory behind social error, for they feel they can make due by indicating agent errors. 
Agent Error Is a Matter of Culture
The FDA official may pretend to be deciding with the general interest in mindhe may pretend to be following the communications that would flow from a benevolent figurative being. Yet often he does not, either because the pretense is fake or because he misunderstands the general interest and how to advance it. Perhaps his figurative beings differ quite fundamentally from others'.
One reason that the micro contexts of bad policy often feel just is that, by procedure and by taboo, political culture has cordoned off certain aspects and consequences, particularly those on coercees and their would-be trading partners, into seemingly separate moral contexts or, indeed, into docility, acquiescence, silence, and invisibility. Whether the FDA official would reproach himself for being stingy depends on his moral qualities, intellectual understandings, and cultural pressures.
What is so saddening about governmentalization is that it not merely suppresses the fruits of voluntary actions but breeds cultures that make the bonds of candid and natural discourse, sympathy, and approbation so clouded, conflicted, and weak. Smith writes:
The great pleasure of conversation and society, besides, arises from a certain correspondence of sentiments and opinions, from a certain harmony of minds, which like so many musical instruments coincide and keep time with one another. Stewart 1794, 310-15; Young 1997, Ch. 8, esp. pp. 192-93, 201; Macfie 1967, 61-62, 75f; and Otteson 2002. systems of morality‖ (TMS, 293), then the author of such a system, if edifying and properly so, would be akin to the impartial spectator.
Smith was culturally tops in his day, but times have changed. In the worst cases, Hayek suggested, the worst get on top. The situation today in the United States and elsewhere is not nearly as bad as that, but still many of the positions of greatest political and cultural power tend to attract, breed, or prosper people who are less than attuned to Smith's moral and economic sensibilities. Those more attuned may criticize them, but such criticism may smack up against the simpler sources of moral approval. It is obnoxious and offensive, at least to those criticized and all who go along with their sentiments or defer to their eminence. One consequence may be dismissal and freeze-out of our enlightened critic, reducing the good he does.
In a letter to David Ricardo, James Mill (1818) urged Ricardo to follow -the plain rule of utility which will always guide you right, and in which there is no mystery.‖ The passage is quoted by A.L. Macfie (1967) When we approve of any character or action, the sentiments which we feel, are, according to the foregoing system, derived from four sources, which are in some respects different from one another. First, we sympathize with the motives of the agent; secondly, we enter into the gratitude of those who receive the benefit of his actions; thirdly, we observe that his conduct has been agreeable to the general rules by which those two sympathies generally act; and, last of all, when we consider such actions as making a part of a system of behaviour which tends to promote the happiness either of the individual or of the society, they appear to derive a beauty from this utility, not unlike that which we ascribe to any wellcontrived machine. After deducting, in any one particular case, all that must be acknowledged to proceed from some one or other of these four principles, I should be glad to know what remains, and I shall freely allow this overplus to be ascribed to a moral sense, or to any other peculiar faculty, provided any body will ascertain precisely what this overplus is. It might be expected, perhaps, that if there was any such peculiar principle, such as this moral sense is supposed to be, we should feel it, in some particular cases, separated and detached from every other, as we often feel joy, sorrow, hope, and fear, pure and unmixed with any other emotion. This however, I imagine, cannot even be pretended. I have never heard any instance alleged in which this principle could be said to exert itself alone and unmixed with sympathy or antipathy, with gratitude or resentment, with the perception of the agreement or disagreement of any action to an established rule, or last of all with that general taste for beauty and order which is excited by inanimated as well as by animated objects. (TMS, Epilogue for the Berger conference I take Professor Berger to be saying that the vitality of liberalism depends on some kind of spiritual, ethical, or mythical vision, commitment, character, sense of purpose. It depends on qualities or factors we often associate with religion. (Here I use the term religion in a broad way that does not necessarily involve -God‖ etc.)
We can rule out any notion of dramatic liberal advance; we are engaged in tugs of war, and the question is vitality at the margin.
The liberty principle may be regarded as a sort of grammar, but its warrants and limits are not grammatical. I think that the mythic sense of liberalism lies in the Smithian sort of allegory presented here. It is inherently vague, discursive, and open-ended.
If so, that helps us address liberalism's spiritual potential. To what extent can the Smithian -religion‖ be persuasively elaborated and propagated? In addressing the question, we correspondingly gauge liberalism's potential.
The liberal religion has focalness only in representatives, personifications, leading intellectuals like Smith, Hayek and Friedman. But a living liberalism will depend on living representatives.
Their prospects depend on the cultural ecology. There are huge challenges facing the emergence of a cohesive and powerful liberal religion.
We must understand that the jewel of western civilization, namely, the liberal lexicon consisting of liberty, freedom, rights, property, contract, liberalism, rule of law, justice, equity, and equality, was systematically subverted during the period say 1880-1940. In came the tide of social democracy. We now dwell in cultural chaos --liberal versus conservative‖, for example. A liberal shaman scarcely knows how to proceed in such an ecology. How are liberal leaders to attain prominence within a culture they regard as deeply perverse?
On the other hand, enlightened ideas hold a certain power, for which we call them -enlightened.‖ Liberal argumentation can better realize this power by explaining to the culture the biases of the cultural ecology. For example, people need to understand that the cultural ecology is itself hugely shaped by government. I also think that the atavisms story, based on the genetic legacy of the solidaric small band, a la Hayek, is fundamental. And so on.
The Smithian allegory needs to be linked back to Smith himself. Smith should become emblematic. The story from Smith, on to the emergence of the liberal lexicon, on to its subversion, the tide of social democracy, the reassertion of atavistic mentalities and sentiments, the statist superstitions of democracy, and the ensuing cultural chaos, must all be offered as one big argument. That is the way of any religion, one big argument.
That's the best story we have to offer. /Dan Klein 20 June 2009 
